Imagine a safe deposit box at a bank
You have a safe deposit box at a bank. The bank guards the box, but doesn't have the key. It doesn't know what's inside. It can't open it. Not even with a court order — because it physically doesn't possess the key.
That's zero-knowledge architecture. The service provider stores your (encrypted) data, but has no technical ability to read it.
Geslar works the same way — the encrypted vault is stored on a server in the EU, and keys only ever leave your device encrypted.
That's zero-knowledge architecture. The service provider stores your (encrypted) data, but has no technical ability to read it.
Geslar works the same way — the encrypted vault is stored on a server in the EU, and keys only ever leave your device encrypted.
How Geslar protects your data
1. Master password
You enter a master password. It is never stored and never sent to the server. You choose how long Škrinjar stays unlocked; when the time runs out, you unlock it again. Geslar doesn't know your password.
2. Argon2id key derivation
From your master password, Argon2id derives a cryptographic key on your device. Argon2id is intentionally slow and memory-hard — every guess costs an attacker dearly.
3. AES-256-GCM encryption
The vault content is encrypted with AES-256-GCM — an international encryption standard. A 256-bit key has 2^256 possible combinations — a number with 78 digits.
4. Storing the encrypted vault
The extension keeps an encrypted copy on your device (also for offline use), and the encrypted vault is stored on a server in the EU. The server only receives encrypted data.
Technical details (for those who want to know)
Argon2id:
Argon2id is the winner of the Password Hashing Competition (2015) and a widely recommended algorithm for deriving a key from a password. It is designed to resist GPU and ASIC attacks because it requires a lot of memory.
Unlike older functions such as PBKDF2, which mostly spend processor time, Argon2id is memory-hard — it is much harder for an attacker to speed up guessing on thousands of GPU cores because each attempt needs a lot of memory.
Argon2id is the winner of the Password Hashing Competition (2015) and a widely recommended algorithm for deriving a key from a password. It is designed to resist GPU and ASIC attacks because it requires a lot of memory.
Unlike older functions such as PBKDF2, which mostly spend processor time, Argon2id is memory-hard — it is much harder for an attacker to speed up guessing on thousands of GPU cores because each attempt needs a lot of memory.
AES-256-GCM:
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) not only encrypts data but also authenticates it. Encrypted data cannot be changed unnoticed — any tampering attempt results in a failed decryption.
Each encryption uses a new random nonce (one-time number) — even if you encrypt the same data twice, the result will be completely different.
GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) not only encrypts data but also authenticates it. Encrypted data cannot be changed unnoticed — any tampering attempt results in a failed decryption.
Each encryption uses a new random nonce (one-time number) — even if you encrypt the same data twice, the result will be completely different.
Salt:
Each account has a unique random salt that is used together with the master password when the key is derived. So even two users with identical master passwords get completely different keys.
Each account has a unique random salt that is used together with the master password when the key is derived. So even two users with identical master passwords get completely different keys.
What does this mean in practice?
Geslar cannot read your data
The vault content is encrypted on your device. Geslar cannot decrypt it — not the development team, not under a court order — because we do not hold the key. Shared vaults can be opened by the members you share them with, and in business organisations the owner and administrators can open the organisation's vaults; Geslar still cannot open them.
A stolen device does not reveal your passwords
While Škrinjar is locked, only encrypted data is on the device. Without your master password (or recovery key) a thief cannot open it — not even with access to the disk.
The server never holds the key
The server only holds encrypted content; keys never leave your device unencrypted. A server breach does not hand an attacker your passwords in plain text.
You are responsible for your master password
Geslar doesn't know your master password and cannot reset it. If you forget it, your way back is the recovery key you get at registration — so keep it somewhere safe. Without the master password and without the recovery key, Geslar cannot open your data.
Geslar and other cloud password managers
Many password managers describe themselves as "zero-knowledge": data is encrypted on the device, and the server never sees it in readable form.
Like Geslar, such managers store your encrypted data on servers. This means there are risks:
Like Geslar, such managers store your encrypted data on servers. This means there are risks:
Risk 1: If an attacker breaches the server, they get encrypted vaults. Now they have unlimited time to attempt brute force on your master password — offline, with no attempt limits.
Risk 2: A client software update could theoretically introduce a malicious change — this applies to every password manager, including Geslar. That is why extension updates go through the browser stores, and code changes go through review and automated checks.
Risk 2: A client software update could theoretically introduce a malicious change — this applies to every password manager, including Geslar. That is why extension updates go through the browser stores, and code changes go through review and automated checks.
Geslar also stores encrypted content on a server in the EU. The content is encrypted on your device, and protection depends on the strength of your master password and the Argon2id key derivation.
The only weakness: you
In a zero-knowledge system, security depends on the strength of your master password. If you use "password123" as your master password — neither AES-256 nor Argon2id will save you.
Master password recommendations:
Master password recommendations:
Use a passphrase
Instead of "M@rk0_2024!" use a phrase of 5 or more random words, e.g. "meadow-cloud-chocolate-chestnut-lighthouse". The more words, the better — and it is easier to remember. More about passphrases.
Never share it
Only you know your master password. There is no reason for anyone to ever know it — not a partner, not IT support, not the Geslar team.
Conclusion
Zero-knowledge is not a marketing term — it's an architectural decision that determines who can access your data. With Geslar, the answer is simple: you — not Geslar.
The content is encrypted on your device, and the server never sees the key or the content in readable form. Only your master password and your recovery key lead to your vault. That's privacy as it should be.
The content is encrypted on your device, and the server never sees the key or the content in readable form. Only your master password and your recovery key lead to your vault. That's privacy as it should be.
How we solve this at Geslar
The content is encrypted on your device, and the server never sees the key or the content in readable form. Only your master password and your recovery key lead to your vault.
Read about security →
Read about security →
Your passwords in one safe placeŠkrinjar is the Geslar password manager.
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