geslar-vezar-x64.msi from https://dl.geslar.app/vezar/latest/geslar-vezar-x64.msi.AutoUpdate = 0 under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Geslar\Vezar).There are currently no published security advisories. Fixes are listed in the release notes.
State of the code: 18 November 2026
Cryptographic profile — Geslar Vezar
For customers and questionnaires (NIS2 Art. 21(2)(h), ISO/IEC 27001 A.8.24).
All protocols are implemented by Vezar’s own client in the helper service for Windows (without Windows RAS, openvpn.exe or OpenConnect). Traffic goes through the Wintun network adapter, and WireGuard through the WireGuardNT driver. Cryptographic libraries:
| Protocol | User / device sign-in | Server verification | Traffic encryption |
|---|---|---|---|
| IKEv2 | EAP-MSCHAPv2, PEAP (MS-CHAPv2 inside), EAP-TLS (certificate from Windows or from a smart card), EAP-TTLS (PAP or MS-CHAPv2 inside), EAP-GTC (one-time code), PSK, certificate (RSA, ECDSA; smart card) | certificate: Windows trust chain, revocation, name, purpose; or PSK | ESP: AES-GCM or AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA |
| IPsec IKEv1 (dial-up, e.g. FortiGate, Cisco) | PSK + XAUTH (user/password, one-time code), certificate (RSA) | PSK or certificate | ESP: AES-CBC/3DES + HMAC-SHA |
| L2TP/IPsec | IPsec: PSK or certificate; PPP: MS-CHAPv2, CHAP-MD5 or PAP (inside ESP) | PSK or certificate | ESP (transport mode) |
| SSTP | PPP MS-CHAPv2 inside TLS, with cryptographic binding (SHA-256; SHA-1 only if the server does not offer SHA-256); PEAP (MS-CHAPv2 inside); EAP-TLS (certificate from Windows) | TLS: Windows trust chain, revocation, name, purpose; the sign-in server is verified against the Windows certificate store and by name, without a trust exception of the outer tunnel | TLS 1.2 / 1.3 |
| OpenVPN | certificate (PEM, PKCS#8, PKCS#12, Windows store / smart card), user/password, or both | chain to the CA from the .ovpn, server purpose (remote-cert-tls), verify-x509-name (as in OpenVPN) | AES-GCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305; AES-CBC + HMAC only if the configuration asks for it |
| SSL VPN (Cisco AnyConnect / OpenConnect, Fortinet) | user/password (+ second factor), certificate, sign-in in the system browser (SAML/SSO) | TLS: Windows trust chain, revocation, name, purpose (also for DTLS with Fortinet) | TLS 1.2 / 1.3; DTLS 1.2 when the server offers it (TLS stays as the fallback) |
| WireGuard | static key (Curve25519), optional pre-shared peer key | peer’s public key from the configuration | ChaCha20-Poly1305 (Noise IK, BLAKE2s) — the protocol has no algorithm choice |
PPTP is deliberately not supported (obsolete); on import it is only recognised.
AES and SHA-2 are used by default. Legacy algorithms stay at the end of the default proposal only for older servers (IKEv1: 3DES and SHA-1; IKEv2: SHA-1 for ESP); the server chooses, so modern servers don’t select them.
Expired password change: supported for MS-CHAPv2 (SSTP, L2TP/IPsec), EAP-MSCHAPv2 and PEAP (IKEv2, SSTP), and Cisco AnyConnect / ocserv (the server's password form). The new password is sent only to the company's server, through the protected sign-in channel. The current password, when it was saved, is checked on the computer before it is sent.
| Setting | Default offer (in order) | Additionally allowed by a setting |
|---|---|---|
| IKE cipher | AES-256-GCM, AES-128-GCM, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CBC | — |
| IKE integrity / PRF | SHA-384, SHA-256, SHA-512 | SHA-1 |
| DH group | ECP-384, ECP-256, Curve25519, MODP-2048 | ECP-521, MODP-4096, MODP-3072, MODP-1536, MODP-1024 |
| ESP cipher | AES-256-GCM, AES-128-GCM, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CBC | 3DES |
| ESP integrity (with CBC) | SHA-256, SHA-512, SHA-384, SHA-1 | — |
| IKE / ESP lifetime | 28,800 s / 3,600 s | per setting |
| AUTH signature (RFC 7427) | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and PSS (SHA-256/384/512), ECDSA P-256/384/521 | — |
Other:
| Setting | Default | Allowed |
|---|---|---|
| Phase 1 mode | aggressive (dial-up with group ID); L2TP uses main | aggressive, main |
| Phase 1 cipher | AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CBC, 3DES | + AES-192-CBC |
| Phase 1 hash/PRF | SHA-256, SHA-1 | — |
| DH group | 14 (MODP-2048) | ECP-384, ECP-521, ECP-256, Curve25519, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-1536, MODP-1024 |
| ESP cipher | AES-256-CBC, AES-128-CBC, 3DES | — |
| ESP integrity | SHA-256, SHA-1 | SHA-512, SHA-384 |
| Phase 2 PFS | as the server requires | group of your choice |
| Phase 1 / 2 lifetime | 28,800 s / 3,600 s | per setting |
| Certificates | RSA signature | — (ECDSA is not supported for IKEv1) |
Other:
Control channel:
tls-auth (HMAC), tls-crypt (AES-256-CTR + HMAC-SHA-256) or tls-crypt-v2;secret) is not supported.Data channel:
Compression: never compressed (protection against the VORACLE attack), and compressed packets from the server are dropped.
Password-protected keys:
TLS:
DTLS 1.2 (OpenSSL):
Sign-in in the browser (SAML/SSO): the system browser returns the response only to the application’s local listener on the loopback address.
Only the user starts it, once per click, and it checks only the address they typed, for at most 5 seconds; nothing goes to Geslar. Only the first steps of setting up a connection are sent, without a password, pre-shared key or user name: TCP 443, 10443, 4443, 8443, 1443, 4433, 943 and 1194, and UDP 500, 1194, 443, 51820, 4500 and one random port 33434–33533. With IKEv2 the first sign-in step is sent too, with the identity “anonymous” and no credentials; it stays in the server's log, and some devices (e.g. FortiGate, Sophos) may record it or block the address for a while. During the check the service lets in ICMP “unreachable” messages from the checked address only; the filter is removed at the end of the check, on an error and when the service stops, and adding and removing it is recorded in the service log. The check does not run while a VPN connection is up or the traffic block holds, the server's certificate is never accepted by itself, and the app never moves to a weaker way of connecting by itself.
| Item | Risk | Recommendation |
|---|---|---|
| IKEv1 aggressive mode + PSK | the PSK hash can be captured and cracked offline (NIST SP 800-77r1) | long random PSK (≥ 20 characters); on the server use IKEv2 or certificates where possible |
| 3DES, SHA-1, DH 2/5, MODP-1024/1536 | obsolete (NIST SP 800-131A) | offered only for old servers (IKEv2: SHA-1 for ESP at the end of the default proposal; SHA-1 for IKE and 3DES for ESP only if the administrator adds them) |
| MS-CHAPv2 / CHAP-MD5 / PAP (L2TP, SSTP) | weak by themselves | used only inside ESP or TLS; prefer IKEv2 with certificates or EAP-TTLS |
| IKEv1/ESP without AES-GCM | CBC + HMAC is sound, but not a modern AEAD | for new servers use IKEv2 (AES-GCM) |
| OpenVPN without server name verification | as in OpenVPN: trusts every CA certificate from the configuration that has the server purpose | use verify-x509-name in the .ovpn and a dedicated CA for the VPN |
| Post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM, RFC 9370) | not supported | we follow developments on servers |