Comparisons

The 2022 LastPass breach: what happened and what to learn

The 2022 security incident, stolen backups of user vaults, and a lesson about what actually protects your passwords.

updated 4 min read

Contents

What happened?

In 2022, attackers broke into LastPass's development environment. The first notices were reassuring — the full scope only became clear at the end of the year (Wikipedia).

At the end of 2022, LastPass announced that attackers had obtained backups of user vaults — encrypted, but with some data, such as website addresses, unencrypted. That means:
Millions
of LastPass users affected by the theft of vault backups
Years
Cryptocurrency thefts are still being linked to the stolen vaults years later (Krebs on Security, 2025)
Old accounts
Some older accounts had much weaker key-derivation settings than the later defaults
∞
Time attackers have for offline brute force — they can try to crack the stolen copies with no time limit

Timeline of failures

Summer 2022
Attackers access LastPass's development environment. The first notice tells users their data was not affected.
Autumn 2022
LastPass reports new suspicious activity in its cloud storage, linked to information from the first attack.
End of 2022
The full picture: backups of user vaults were stolen. Website addresses were unencrypted; passwords, usernames and notes were encrypted.
The years after
Reports link cryptocurrency thefts to the stolen vaults — proof that offline attacks pay off when the master password is weak.

What actually went wrong

The lesson is not "no cloud", but: encrypt everything on the device, including metadata, and use a strong, modern key derivation.
Centralized target
Many vaults in one place make an attractive target. Attackers didn't target you personally — they targeted everyone at once. That is why everything must be encrypted before it leaves the device.
Offline attack
Once an attacker has your encrypted vault, they can try to crack it for years. No lockouts, no rate limits. If your master password is weak — it's only a matter of time.
Metadata in plain text
The addresses of websites you log into were unencrypted. The attacker knows you use online banking, a crypto exchange, or a health portal — even without cracking the vault.
Weak KDF on old accounts
Some older accounts had much weaker key-derivation settings than the later defaults. Many users were never moved to stronger protection — and they didn't even know it.

Encryption on your device as a solution

Geslar is built on the belief that the content of your data should be encrypted on your device, and keys never leave the device unencrypted — so we cannot read your data either.
The server cannot see the content
The encrypted vault is stored on a server in the EU, but it is encrypted on your device and the server has no key. Geslar encrypts the entire content of an entry, including website addresses.
AES-256-GCM + Argon2id
Geslar uses the modern AES-256-GCM encryption standard and Argon2id — a memory-hard KDF resistant to GPU attacks that makes every guess expensive.
No tracking of individuals
No ads and no tracking of individuals. Only security events are recorded — the same ones you see in your activity log.
Generator without an account
The password generator and Secure send work without an account. For Škrinjar we only need an email and the necessary data; we cannot see the vault content.

What to learn from the breach

What the LastPass incident taught us:

  • "Encrypted in the cloud" does not mean "secure" — encryption is only as strong as your master password
  • The full picture of an incident often arrives only later
  • Metadata is also data — knowing which websites you use is valuable information for attackers
  • Centralized storage is an attractive target — so everything must be encrypted before it leaves the device
  • Older accounts may have weaker protection than you think
If you're a LastPass user, consider switching to a password manager that encrypts content on your device and uses a modern KDF (Argon2id). Škrinjar imports a LastPass export, and the import runs locally in your browser.

How we solve this at Geslar

Škrinjar encrypts vault content on your device, before it leaves it, so it does not rely only on the protection of cloud storage. A LastPass export is imported locally in your browser.

Read about security →
Compare for yourself — try ŠkrinjarŠkrinjar is the Geslar password manager.
Try Škrinjar →
Author
Geslar
Geslar d.o.o. builds Škrinjar and Vezar — password and access protection for people and businesses.
More about Geslar →